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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
C. A. DAVIS, dba C. A. Davis Com-
pany a.nd CHARLES MONT MA-
HONEY, S-TANFORD MAH.ONEY 
and J. J. MAHONEY, dba Red Cedar 
:Niill Company, a co-partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
LAVELL KEMP, and B R Y C E 
CHENEY, dba Lost River Saw Mill 
Co., a co-partnership, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Case No. 8148 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
S.TATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs and respondents agree with defendant and 
appellant's statement of facts down to the middle of page 
3 of appellant's brief. From that point on we disagree. 
Continuing from said point the facts are as follows: 
The written agreement (Exhibit 8) between Kemp 
and Blackburn contained the entire agreement between 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
them with respect to the sale of the sawmill and equip-
ment. There were no side or verbal agree1nents respect-
ing the sale. (R. 99, 100) An examination of Exhibit 
8 shows that Blackburn did not assume the obligation 
that is the subject of this lawsuit at the time the sale 
was made. Such an assun1ption occurred, if at all, a year 
later in April 1952 at a meeting held in Kemp's home in 
Salt Lake City, when Kemp invited Blackburn, Davis and 
Charles M. Mahoney to his hon1e to discuss the obligation 
and the matter of payment. 
Blackburn owed Kemp money on the purchase price 
of the sawmill and defendant, Ke1np, owed plaintiffs the 
obligation in question (R. 49, 50). At the said April1952 
meeting Blackburn, at Ke1np's request, agreed to pay 
part of the money he owed to Ken1p by delivering 17,000 
feet of lumber to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs in turn agreed that 
if and when Blackburn did deliver the lumber they would 
release ICen1p from the obligation he owed them. (R. 47 
to 52, 72, 117) 
Plain tiffs did not release or agree to release Kemp 
from the obligation (R. 72, 73, 78, 96, 97, 101). Black-
burn was supposed to make delivery of the lumber in two 
loads of 8500 feet each. The first load was to be delivered 
in May 1952 and the second load in June 1952. Davis 
called Blackburn and asked him why the lumber had not 
been delivered. Blackburn told him his planer had broken 
down and that whatever lu1nber he was able to plane he 
felt he should sell for ready cash. He then said he could 
deliver the lumber in another month (R. 79). Plaintiffs 
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went along with the delay because there was nothing 
else they could do ( R .. 7 4, 77). 
Defendant is appealing only from the money judg-
ment entered by the court and is not appealing from the 
judgment of no cause of action on defendant's counter-
claim (defendant's brief pages 2 and 4). The evidence 
pertaining to the taking of the tractor by plaintiffs is 
material only on the counterclaim of defendant. We dis-
agree with defendant's statement of facts regarding 
the taking of the tractor, however, since the counterclaim 
is not involved in this appeal, we will not state our version 
of the facts on that point. 
We have restricted our stateinent of facts to those 
that are material to the narrow issues raised by de-
fendant in his brief. 
POINTS ARGUED BY RESPONDENT 
I. Defendant, Lavell Kemp, was not discharged 
from liability on the obligation in question. 
A. Plaintiffs did not agree to discharge defend-
ant from the obligation. 
B. Blackburn did not assume the obligation. 
C. Assuming, for purpose of argument, that 
Blackburn did assume the obligation, plaintiff's did 
not consent to a material alteration in the nature or 
time of payment of such obligation. 
1. For extension agreement to discharge 
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retiring partner, (Ke1np) it 1nust be a binding 
contract. 
2. No consideration for claimed extension 
agreement. 
3. There was no change in the nature of 
the obligation. 
4. Kemp consented to the purported and 
claimed extension granted to Blackburn. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I 
DEFENDANT, LAVELL KEMP, WAS NOT DISCHARGED 
FROM LIABILITY ON THE OBLIGATION IN QUESTION. 
Subsections 1, 2 and 3 of Section 48-1-33, U.C.A., 
1953, provides : 
"1. The dissolution of a partnership does not 
of itself discharge the existing liability of any 
partner. 
2. A partner is discharged for any existing 
liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an 
agreement to that effect between himself, the part-
nership creditor and the person or partnership 
continuing the business; and such agreen1ent may 
be inferred from the course of dealing between the 
creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and 
the p·erson or partnership continuing the business. 
3. Where a person agrees to assume the ex-
isting obligations of a dissolved partnership, the 
partners whose obligations have been assumed 
shall be discharged from any liability to any credi-
tor of the partnership who, knowing of the agree-
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ment, consents to a material alteration in the na-
ture or time of payment of such obligations." 
Under subsection (1) of this statute it is obvious that 
Kemp remained liable on the debt to plaintiffs after dis-
solution of the Kemp-Cheney partnership. 
A. PLAINTIFFS DID NOT AGREE TO DISCHARGE 
DEFENDANT FROM THE OBLIGATION. 
Subsection (2) of the statute has no application to the 
case at bar because plaintiffs did not agree to release or 
discharge Kemp from the obligation (R. 72, 73, 78, 96, 
97, 101). 
Ke1np, on cross examination, admitted that when his 
deposition 'vas taken he testified that he did not remem-
ber Davis or Mahoney saying anything that indicated 
they were going to release Kemp from his obligation (R. 
96, 97, 101). The trial court found that plaintiffs did not 
agree at any tin1e to release Kemp from the debt (R.117). 
B. BLACKBURN DID NOT ASSUME THE DEBT. 
The trial court found that Blackburn did not assume 
or agree to assu1ne the obligation owed by Kemp to plain-
tiffs (R. 117). 
Exhibit 8 constituted the entire agreement between 
Blackburn and Ken1p at the time of the sale of the saw-
mill and equipment (R. 99, 100). An examination of that 
exhibit shows Blackburn did not assume the obligation 
in question at the time of said sale. 
The only other t'ime Blackburn could have assumed 
the obligation was at the meeting in Kemp's home during 
the month of April1952. All of the evidence pertaining to 
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that meeting is contained on pages 45 to 52, 60, 61, 69 
to 80, 84 to 87, 96, 97, 101 of the record. 
The evidence shows that Blackburn owed Ke1np a 
substantial amount of money on the purchase price of the 
sawmill and that Kemp owed plaintiffs the money in 
question. Plaintiffs had been after Kemp to pay the debt 
(R. 84). Kemp wanted to collect his own money from 
Blackburn, so Kemp, in order to collect part of the money 
due him, asked Blackburn to pay plaintiff's what Kemp 
owed them with lumber. This was nothing more than an 
arrangement of convenience whereby plaintiffs would ac-
cept the lumber if Blackburn delivered it and if he did 
deliver it then part of Blackburn's debt to Kemp would be 
paid and Kemp's debt to plaintiffs would be paid (R .. 45, 
46, 4 7, 73). Plain tiffs never considered that they had 
any legal rights as against Blackburn, but they always 
felt their rights were against Kemp only (R. 60). 
The arrangement for delivery of the lun1ber by 
Blackburn to the plaintiffs is very similar to the situa-· 
tion where the wage earner arranges with his boss to pay 
so much out of his wages to the creditor. The creditor 
is happy to accept the payments from the boss and to that 
extent discharge the wage earner, but if the boss doesn't 
pay, certainly the creditor could not clain1 the boss had 
assumed the obligation. 
We submit that the evidence amply sustains the 
finding of the trial court that Blackburn did not assu1ne 
the obligation in question. 
Under subsection (3) of the quoted statute one of the 
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elements essential to the discharge of Ke1np is that some-
one assume the obligation in question. Absent such an 
assumption there can be no discharge of Kemp. 
C. ASSUMING FOR PURPOSE OF ARGUMENT, THAT 
BLACKBURN DID ASSUME THE OBLIGATION OF KEMP, 
PLAINTIFFS DID NOT CONSENT TO A MATERIAL AL-
TERATION IN THE NATURE OR TIME OF PAYMENT OF 
SUCH OBLIGATION. 
It is generally held that an agreement between the 
withdrawing partner (Kemp) and the continuing partner 
or purchaser of the business (Blackburn) whereby the 
latter assumes the payment of the firm debts operates 
to render the retiring partner (Kemp) liable merely as 
a surety for their payment. 68 C.J'.S., Section 264, p. 
755. Nelson v. Century Indemnity Co., 65 F. (2) 765 
Ninth Cir. Preston v. Garrard, 120 Ga. 689, 48 S.E. 118. 
Subsection (3) of the statute quoted above fixes the re-
lationship between the retiring partner and the purchaser 
continuing the business or the person assuming the obliga-
tion as that of principal and surety and the creditor is 
required to recognize that relationship. 
1. FOR EXTENSION AGREEMENT TO DISCHARGE 
RETIRING PARTNER, (KEMP), IT MUST BE A BINDING 
CONTRACT. 
Assuming for purposes of argument that Blackburn 
in fact assu1ned the obligation in question, did the conduct 
of plaintiffs an1ount to such an extension of time of pay-
tnent as to discharge Kemp from the debt~ 72 C.J.S .. Sec-
tion 17 4, p. 652 states the general rule as follows: "There 
must be a binding enforceable contract extending the 
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time of payment to the principal debtor in order to ef-
fect a release of the surety." 
The case of Lenger v. Hulst, 259 Mich. 640, 244 N.W. 
187, cited by ap·pellant recognizes and states the general 
rule that the extension must be a binding enforceable 
contract which prevents the creditor fron1 enforcing pay-
ment from the p·rincipal during the extended time. The 
Michigan Court said, "but he was released, when, without 
his_ consent or acquiescence, in any way, plaintiffs by 
renewal of each of these notes extended the time within 
which the obligations were payable and could be enforced 
* * * u~til plaintiff voluntarily extended the time within 
~which each of these notes were payable, payment could 
have been enforcd agailnst defendarn.t." (Italics ours.) In 
this case the notes in question had been renewed several 
times for ninety day periods. The renewals were binding 
extension agreements. The decision on its facts is certain-
-~y r~ght but is n?.t authority for the propositions defend-
ant cites it for. 
2. NO CONSIDERATION FOR CLAIMED EXTENSION 
AGREEMENT. 
72 C.J.S., Section 182, p. 656 states: "that an agree-
ment for an extension of time n1ust be supported by a 
sufficient consideration in order to effect the discharge 
of the surety." Brill v. Hoile, 11 N.W. 42, 53 Wis. 531 
holds in --effect that if the party relies on an agreement 
for an extension of time there must be a valid considera-
tion for such extension before it will op·erate to discharge 
the retiring partner from the obligation. To the same 
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effect see Associate Discou;nt Corp. v. Greisinger, et al., 
103 F. Supp. 705. Barlow v. Frederick Stearns Co., 98 
S.W. 455, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 321. 
Mere delay, indulgence or forbearance to the princi-
pal will not discharge the surety. 72 C.J.S., Sec. 17 4, p. 
652. The court in Michelin Tire Co. v. Akens, 255 Pac. 
388, 32 N.~f. 234, said: 
"Mere delay or forbearance in enforcing col-
lection by creditor against a partner assuming the 
debt (principal) does not effect the retiring part-
ner (surety's) release. An extension of time will 
do it. But mere forbearance will not. It is settled 
as a general rule that the mere passive delay of the 
creditor in proceeding against the principal, how-
ever long continued and however injurious it may 
be to the surety will not discharge the surety. In 
such case the contract is not changed and the 
surety may at any tin1e pay the debt and proceed 
against the principal." 
The court goes on to say, 
"While a surety may be discharged by an 
agreement between the creditor and the principal 
debtor for an extension of the time of payment, 
the essential elements of a contract must be pres-
ent; not only must the agreement be upon a suffi-
cient consideration, but the time of payment must 
be definitely fixed; otherwise the surety will not 
be discharged." 
40 Am. ,Jur., Sec. 215, p. 280 cites the Michelin Case 
and says: 
"But mere forbearance of the creditor to press 
collection does not, it has been held, release the 
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retiring partner's liability even though he rnay be 
regarded as having the status merely of a surety, 
and even though in the meantime the situation rnay 
have so changed that the retiring partner cannot 
enforce indemnity against the continuing partner." 
In Barlow v. Fredrick Stearns & Co., supra, the 
court said, 
"Plaintiff was never, by any agreement shown 
in the record, placed in a position in which the 
right to enforce the payment of the account was 
deferred, and the delay in bringing the suit was 
due to mere forbearance on its part, and not be-
cause of any binding agreement which prevented 
such suit. Unless the agreement to extend is of 
such binding force as to prevent suit upon the 
claim during the time covered by the alleged ex-
tension, it is not such an agreement with a princi-
pal debtor as will release the surety." 
Advance Rubber Co. v. Bershad, 211 N.Y.S. 574, 
holds that: 
1. F·ailure to sue is not a material alteration in na-
ture or time of payment within Partnership Law Sec. 
67, releasing partner whose obligations have been as-
sumed on dissolution of partnership from liability to 
creditor of partnership·, "\Vho, knowing of the agreement, 
consents to material alteration in nature or time of pay-
ment of such obligations. 
2. Mere indulgence by creditor of principal debtor 
will not discharge the surety. 
Ap·plying the doctrine of the cases and texts cited 
above to the case before this court, it is obvious that there 
was no agreement between plaintiffs and Blackburn to 
10 
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extend the time for delivery of the lumber. The record 
can be searched through and no evidence of a considera-
tion for such an extension agreement can he found. 
The trial court found that plaintiffs did not extend 
the time of payment for Blackburn (R. 117, 118). Black-
burn was supposed to deliver one load of lumber in May 
1952 and one in June of that year (R. 76, 77). When it 
was not delivered Davis called Blackburn on the phone 
and asked why it hadn't been delivered. Blackburn re-
plied that his planer was broken down and that whatever 
lumber he was able to plane he felt he should sell it for 
ready cash. He then said he could deliver the lumber 
in another month (R. 79). Plaintiffs went along with the 
delay because there vvas nothing else they could do about 
it (R. 74, 77). 
It should he noted that Blackburn did not call plain-
tiffs and ask for more time, nor did he promise to do any-
thing more than he had already stated he would do, in 
return for plaintiffs granting him more time. Instead 
Davis had to call Blackburn and Blackburn said he 
would deliver the lumber next month. Plaintiffs didn't 
agree that that was alright, they merely delayed or for-
bore doing anything (assuming Blackburn had assumed 
the obligation and plaintiffs had a right against him) 
about enforcing the obligation. 
We subinit that under the doctrine of the cases cited 
above there was no extension by plaintiffs of the time 
for payment. "l_1here was no consideration for such an 
extension agreen1ent. The most plaintiffs' conduct vvould 
11 
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amount to was a delay, indulgence or forbearance to 
Blackburn and therefore Kemp is not discharged. 
3. THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF 
THE OBLIGATION. 
Defendant claims that there was a change in the na-
ture of the obligation in that, when the loan was origin-
ally made to Kemp, the terms of payn1ent were different 
than the terms of payment claimed to have been made 
with Blackburn at the April1952 meeting. 
In the first place Blackburn did not assume the obli-
gation in question, and hence the relation of principal and 
surety did not exist between Kemp and Blackburn (R. 
117). Kemp always remained primarily liable to plain-
tiffs. Secondly if we assume for purpose of argument 
only, that Blackburn did assume the obligation and Kemp 
was placed in the p-osition of a surety, the law is clear 
that a surety is not discharged by an extension of the 
time of payment or performance or a change in the nature 
of payment to which he consents. 72 C.J.S. S.ections 158 
and 191, pages 644 and 660, Lenger v. Hulst, supra, Pres-
ton v. Garrard, supra. 
Kemp was the one responsible for getting all the par-
ties together in Ap·ril 1952 for the meeting at Kemps 
home (R. 84, 85). Kemp knew of the purported arrange-
ment for Blackburn to deliver lumber to plaintiffs and he 
knew the terms thereof. Having procured and consented 
to such arrangement, Kemp cannot now claim it was a 
material alteration in the nature of payment which dis-
charges him from the debt. 
12 
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4. KEMP CONSENTED TO THE PURPORTED AND 
CLAIMED EXTENSION GRANTED TO BLACKBURN. 
All of the evidence in the record shows that Kemp 
had knowledge of and consented to Blackburn's delay in 
delivering the lumber to plaintiffs (R. 51, 52, 59, 60, 79, 
80). Kemp did not deny the testimony of Mahoney & 
Davis. Their testimony shows affirmatively that Kemp 
had knowledge of and consented to Blackburn's delay in 
delivering the lumber to plaintiffs. Since all of the evi-
dence in the record, together 'vith Kemp's failure to deny 
the same, shows that he did consent to such delay, he can-
not now claim that he was discharged from the obliga-
tion in question. 72 C.J.S. Sections 158 and 191, pages 
644 and 660, Lenger v. HruJst, supra, Preston v. Garrard, 
supra. 
SUM11ARY 
In summary we submit that Lavell Kemp was not 
discharged from the obligation for the following reasons: 
1. There was no assu1nption of the debt by Black-
burn. The arrangement between Blackburn and 
·plaintiffs and Kemp was merely one of conveni-
ence. 
2. Assuming that Blackburn did assu1ne the debt 
there was still no discharge because, 
a. There was no agreen1ent between plaintiffs 
and Blackburn for the claimed extension. 
b. If there 'vas an agreement for an extension 
there was no consideration therefor, hence 
the agreement was not enforceable and 
13 
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would not result in ·a discharge of Kemp. 
c. If there was an enforceable extension agree-
ment, Kemp had knowledge thereof and con-
sented thereto and hence could not claim a 
discharge. 
d. Plaintiffs conduct, with relation to the 
claimed extension of time for payment was 
nothing more than mere delay, indulgence 
or forbearance and therefore would not re-
sult in a discharge of the debt. 
Resp.ectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI, 
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